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Sunspot equilibrium and lottery equilibrium are two stochastic solution concepts for 
nonstochastic economies. Recent work by Garratt, Keister, Qin, and Shell (in press) 
and Kehoe, Levine, and Prescott (in press) on nonconvex exchange economies has 
shown that when the randomizing device is continuous, applying the two concepts to 
the same fundamental economy yields the same set of equilibrium allocations. In the 
present paper, we examine economies based on a discrete randomizing device. We 
extend the lottery model so that it can constrain the randomization possibilities 
available to agents in the same way that the sunspots model can. Every equilibrium 
allocation of our generalized lottery model has a corresponding sunspot equilibrium 
allocation. For almost all discrete randomizing devices, the converse is also true. 
There are exceptions, however: for some randomizing devices, there exist sunspot 








* We thank Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, Lucca Bossi, David Easley, and especially Jim Peck for 
helpful comments and discussions. We also thank seminar participants at Cornell, ITAM, Ohio 
State, the 2000 NBER General Equilibrium Conference, and the Extrinsic Uncertainty Workshop at 
NYU in May 2000. Part of this work was completed while Keister was visiting the University of 
Texas at Austin, whose hospitality and support are gratefully acknowledged. 1 Introduction
In nonconvex economies, agents often prefer stochastic allocations to nonstochastic ones. When a good
is indivisible, for example, even risk averse consumers can beneﬁt from the ability to purchase a contract
that delivers the good with some probability, instead of having to choose between buying it either with
certainty or not at all. In such a situation, it is natural to use a stochastic equilibrium concept, even when
the fundamentals of the economy are nonstochastic. That is, it is natural to introduce uncertainty that is
extrinsic (i.e., does not affect endowments, technologies, or preferences) and to allow agents to trade in
contracts whose payoffs depend on the outcome of this uncertainty. This is precisely the approach taken
in two well-known general equilibrium concepts: sunspot equilibrium, as introduced in Shell (1977) and
Cass and Shell (1983), and lottery equilibrium, as introduced in Prescott and Townsend (1984a,b). Since
the two models bring different approaches to bear on the same problem, it is natural to ask how their
predictions compare. What is the relationship between the set of sunspot equilibrium allocations and the
set of lottery equilibrium allocations for the same fundamental economy? We address this question for
exchange economies where the number of consumers, the number of commodities, and the randomization
possibilities are all ﬁnite.
The two equilibrium concepts have very different histories. Sunspot equilibrium was introduced as an
explanation of “excess” market volatility within the rational-expectations framework. The original sunspots
models were based on standard, convex overlapping-generations economies. Equilibria in which sunspots
affect allocations in a strictly convex environment are inefﬁcient; when consumers are risk averse, an alloca-
tion with “excess” volatility can always be Pareto dominated by a feasible allocation without such volatility.
A large literature has extended the sunspots approach to a wide variety of models, with the focus remain-
ing almost exclusively on suboptimal equilibria in convex environments. Lottery equilibrium, on the other
hand, was designed as a method for decentralizing allocations in economies with adverse selection and
moral hazard. Such informational asymmetries create noncovexities in consumers’ opportunity sets, which
makes addressing basic questions such as the existence of equilibrium very difﬁcult. Trade in lotteries was
introduced largely to “convexify” the economy and thereby permit standard general-equilibrium analysis to
be performed in environments with asymmetric information. Hence the focus in lottery models has been on
(constrained) optimal allocations in economies with nonconvexities.
Despite these differences, both models of trade can be applied to the general problem of a nonconvex
economy where agents would like to purchase stochastic allocations. We assume that there are complete
markets, no restrictions to participation on those markets, and symmetric information. Our focus in this
paper is on economies with consumption nonconvexities: some goods are indivisible and consumers may be
1risk-loving. This represents the minimum departure from the standard Walrasian setting needed in order for
stochastic trade to be useful. The fundamental economy is comprised of the set of consumers, together with
the endowments and preferences, a (common) consumption set, and an extrinsic randomizing device. Both
models can be applied to the same fundamental economy, but they differ considerably in the way trade is
organized. In the sunspots model, extrinsic uncertainty is represented by a set of states of nature, and agents
trade in state-contingent claims, such a “1 automobile to be delivered if state α occurs.” Agents construct
stochastic consumptions by purchasing different bundles to be delivered in different extrinsic states. In
contrast, agents in the lottery model trade directly in probabilities, using assets such as “1 automobile to
be delivered with probability π.” In this way, agents directly purchase a probability distribution over their
consumption set. No reference to a “state of nature” is made.
Since the two models bring different approaches to bear on the same problem, it is natural to ask how
their predictions compare. Shell and Wright (1993) show how the equilibrium employment lotteries of
Rogerson (1988) can be implemented as sunspot equilibria, indicating that there is a close connection
between the two equilibrium concepts. In addition, they show how sunspots can provide the necessary co-
ordination to allocate indivisible goods among a ﬁnite number of consumers.1 Garratt (1995) shows how
the lottery model can be extended to economies with a ﬁnite number of consumers by coordinating the
individual lotteries. He then compares the equilibrium allocations of the lottery model with those generated
by any sunspot variable with a ﬁnite number of states. He ﬁnds that every lottery equilibrium allocation has
a corresponding sunspot equilibrium allocation, but some sunspot equilibrium allocations have no lottery
equilibrium counterpart. The ability to constrain choice sets inherent in the sunspots model can lead to
the existence of an equilibrium that is not present when the choice is unconstrained.2 In a recent paper,
Garratt, Keister, Qin, and Shell (in press, hereafter GKQS) show that if sunspot activity is represented by a
continuous random variable, the two models generate exactly the same set of equilibrium allocations. The
result is proven in a standard general equilibrium model with a ﬁnite number of consumers and a (possibly)
nonconvex consumption set. Kehoe, Levine, and Prescott (in press) show that this same result holds in a
moral hazard economy with a continuum of consumers. In addition to its theoretical importance, the equiv-
alence result has practical implications, as problems that are difﬁcult to solve in one model may be more
easily addressed in the other. For example, Garratt and Keister (in press) show how an outstanding question
regarding when sunspot equilibria are robust to reﬁnements in the sunspot variable is easily solved by look-
1 Prescott and Townsend (1984a,b), Rogerson (1988) and others study lottery economies with a continuum of consumers, where
a law of large numbers implies that no coordination of individual lotteries is necessary.
2 This fact is also evident in Goenka and Shell (1997), which introduces the concept of robustness of sunspot equilibria
to reﬁnements in the randomizing device. They show that, in nonconvex economies, not all sunspot equilibria are robust to
reﬁnements, and hence sunspot equilibria can be destroyed by giving consumers additional randomization possibilities.
2ing at the lottery formulation of the problem. In addition, when the consumption set has a ﬁnite number of
elements, ﬁnding lottery equilibria reduces to solving a collection of linear programming problems, which
can be computationally easier than solving the (nonlinear) sunspots model.
Having a continuous sunspot variable is the “right” comparison for obtaining equivalence because the
lottery model gives consumers an unconstrained choice of probability distributions. Only with a continuous
random variable do consumers in the sunspots model have the same opportunities. However, in many
situations the randomization possibilities available to consumers are best modeled as being constrained
in some way. For example, the government may place legal restrictions on the types of trading allowed
(such as regulating risk classes in insurance) in order to achieve a preferred outcome. As another example,
transactions costs may prevent consumers from trading in a continuum of markets. Such situations are
better represented by the sunspots model with a ﬁnite number of states of nature.
In this paper, we extend the analysis of the relationship between sunspot equilibrium and lottery equilib-
rium to the case of constrained randomization possibilities. Doing so requires that we substantially extend
the lottery model so that it can constrain consumer choice in the same way that the sunspot model does.
We introduce the concept of constrained lotteries, under which only certain types of aggregate lotteries are
possible and therefore only certain individual lotteries are available to consumers. We work in a completely
ﬁnite environment – both the number of consumers and the number of possible lotteries is ﬁnite. We intro-
ducelottery-producingﬁrms thatbothgenerate individual lotteries andcoordinate themtoensure feasibility.
We present this extended model in section 2 below. In section 3, we show that the feasible allocations in
our (generalized) lottery model are the same as those in the corresponding ﬁnite-state sunspots model. This
is our ﬁrst main point: The lottery model can be extended to purely ﬁnite economies.
Our goal is to compare the sets of equilibrium allocations generated by the two models in the ﬁnite
environment. They are potentially different because of a fundamental difference in the two pricing systems.
The lottery model directly assigns prices to probability distributions over the consumption set. This means
that purchasing, say, a particular consumption bundle with probability one-half (and nothing otherwise)
has a posted price. In the sunspots model, prices are assigned to states of nature. When there are many
states, there may be many different combinations of state-contingent consumption plans that generate the
same lottery, and these different combinations may have different costs. In this way the price system in the
sunspots model is more ﬂexible. However, the sunspots model also places certain restrictions on prices that
are not present in the lottery model. To see this, suppose that there are three equally-likely states of nature
and that the sunspots model assigns the same price vector to each of these states. Then the cost of receiving
a particular bundle with probability two-thirds is twice the cost of receiving it with probability one-third,
3because the way a consumer constructs the two-thirds probability is by purchasing the same bundle in two
states of nature. In the lottery model, however, there is no such restriction. The posted price of the bundle
with two-thirds probability can be either more or less than twice the price of the same bundle with one-third
probability. The price system in the lottery model is more ﬂexible in this way. In other words, the two
models deﬁne different objects to be the “basic” commodity of trade to which the law of one price applies.
As a result, the relative valuations generated by a price system in one model may not have a representation
in the other model. If an equilibrium allocation in one model is supported only by prices that cannot be
represented in the other model, the two sets of equilibrium allocations are likely to be different.
In section 4, we examine what restrictions must be satisﬁed by equilibrium prices in each model. For
the sunspots model, we build on the results of GKQS (in press) and show that any equilibrium allocation
can be supported by a price system in which states with equal probability share the same (contingent-
commodity) price vector. This eliminates some, but not all, of the additional ﬂexibility of prices in the
sunspots model. For the lottery model, we show that the absence of arbitrage opportunities for lottery-
producing ﬁrms requires that prices be linear in commodities and additive in the available randomization
opportunities. This eliminates all of the additional ﬂexibility of prices in the lottery model. These pricing
results combine to generate the following results on the sets of equilibrium allocations, which we present in
section 5. For every lottery equilibrium allocation, there is a corresponding sunspot equilibrium allocation.
The converse of this statement is true unless the sunspot equilibrium allocation relies on the additional
ﬂexibility of sunspot prices, that is, unless the support prices cannot be translated into the lottery model.
For almost all discrete randomizing devices, this cannot happen and hence the two models lead to the
same set of equilibrium allocations. However, for some randomizing devices the extra generality in the
sunspot price system does matter and there exist sunspot equilibrium allocations with no lottery equilibrium
counterpart. We present one such example in Section 5.2. The fact that the set of randomizing devices for
which nonequivalence can occur has Lebesgue measure zero does not, of course, imply that such cases
are unimportant in an economic sense. Hence, we summarize our results as follows: The sets of sunspot
equilibrium and lottery equilibrium allocations are often, but not always, equivalent.
2T h e T w o M o d e l s
We begin by describing the fundamental elements of the economy that are common to both models of
trade. We then describe each model in detail.
42.1 The Environment
There is a ﬁnite set H of consumers (indexed by h =1 ,...,H). There are L indivisible consumption
goods, each of which is only available in integer amounts. There is a ﬁnite upper bound bj on the amount
of good j that may be consumed by any one consumer. These bounds allow us, for example, to study the
case of {0,1} goods that has received so much attention in the literature on labor-market lotteries (i.e.,
Rogerson 1988, Hansen 1985, and Shell and Wright 1993). We also assume that there is a single divisible
good (which we label good zero), so that the consumption set is given by
C = C × R+,
where C is a ﬁnite set with K ≡
Q
` b` elements. We can think of the divisible good as “money” or “income
spent on divisible goods.” The literature on lottery equilibrium often assumes that the consumption set has
only a ﬁnite number of points, like our set C, because this simpliﬁes notation, proofs, and computations
(see Prescott and Townsend 1984a, Garratt 1995, and Prescott and Townsend 2000). However, in the case of
ﬁnite randomization possibilities this would imply that consumers are locally satiated at every consumption
bundle and would create equilibria where consumers do not spend all of their income. Such equilibria
are of limited interest, since they are not robust to changes in the environment such as the introduction of
a divisible good.3 By adding a divisible good, we eliminate these equilibria while maintaining much of
the notational convenience of the ﬁnite-set approach. Adding more divisible goods would not change the
analysis in any way.
Each consumer has preferences represented by a Bernoulli utility function Uh : C → R. To simplify the
analysis in what follows, we assume that this function is additively separable in the divisible good, so that
utility can be written as the sum of two functions uh and vh, with
uh : C → R and vh : R+ → R.
We assume that vh is strictly concave for all h, so that consumers are risk averse in the divisible good. This
implies that Pareto optimal allocations can never involve randomization in the assignment of the divisible
good. Our focus in this paper is on how the two different models of trade generate stochastic allocations
of the indivisible goods. The purpose of the divisible good is to provide consumers with a productive use
for any “left over” income. Consumer h also has endowments eh ∈ RL
+ of the indivisible goods and an
endowment e0h ∈ R+ of the divisible good.
3 GKQS (in press) examine sunspots economies with ﬁnite randomization possibilities and provide results that apply only to
equilibria satisfying certain conditions. The conditions deal with exactly this issue – they rule out equilibria that rely on satiation.




plus ar a n d o m -
izing device, which represents the set of stochastic trades that agents can make. We ﬁnd it helpful to think
of this device as a roulette wheel. The wheel has on it a ﬁnite number M of slots, and the probability that
the ball will fall into slot m is given by πm. The wheel can be spun only one time, so that a single spin
represents all of the randomization possibilities available in the economy.4 As we discussed above, there are
practical reasons why the randomization possibilities available to consumers may be constrained. To keep
things simple, however, we interpret the constraints as being technological in nature. The roulette wheel is,
in our framework, the only way in which stochastic allocations can be generated.
To further simplify the notation, we do not allow stochastic allocations of the divisible good. This is
without any loss of generality, because risk-aversion implies that even if we allowed the allocation of the
divisible good to be based on the realization of the randomizing device, it would never occur in equilibrium
in either model. This assumption actually complicates the speciﬁcation of the sunspots model slightly, but
it greatly simpliﬁes the presentation of the lottery model, as we show below.
Let F denote the set of feasible pure (nonstochastic) allocations of the endowments of the indivisible
goods. Using a =( ah)h∈H to denote a pure allocation with ah ∈ C for every h, we then have
F =
(









Both models generate equilibria that consist of a pure allocation of the divisible good paired with a proba-
bility distribution over F. The difference between them is the way in which stochastic trade is organized.
We now describe the two models in detail.
2.2 The Sunspots Model
In the sunspots model, each slot on the roulette wheel is marked with a number and called a “state of
nature.” Consumers then trade in state-contingent claims on every good. Formally, the sunspot variable is
represented by a probability space (S,Σ,π).H e r eS is a ﬁnite set with M elements and Σ is the set of all
subsets of S. The probability of each state s is denoted π (s) and the probability of any subset A of S is
denoted π(A).
Let X be the set of functions xh : S → C,that is, the set of allowable, stochastic individual consumption
plans for the indivisible goods. Prices for the indivisible goods are given by a function p : S → RL
+.5 We
4 If the wheel could be spun more than one time, we could always redeﬁne the wheel so that each slot on the new wheel
represents a sequence of realizations from the multiple spins of the old wheel. In this sense, allowing only a single spin is without
loss of generality.
5 In constrast to the notation in GKQS (in press), the prices p here are the actual contingent-commodity prices. They are not
probability-adjusted prices.
6take the divisible good to be the numeraire, and we use x0h to denote consumer h’s (certain) consumption









p(s) · xh(s)+x0h ≤
X
s
p(s) · eh + e0h,
xh ∈ X, x0h ∈ R+.
Let XH be the set of functions x : S → RLH such that x∗
h ∈ X for all h. The deﬁnition of equilibrium for
the sunspots economy is as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A sunspot equilibrium consists of a price function p∗ : S → RL




(i) Given p∗, (x∗
h,x ∗
0h) solves the consumer’s problem (1) for each h ∈ H,
and
(ii)( x∗,x ∗





Using condition (ii), we see that an equilibrium allocation x∗ of the indivisible goods generates a probabil-
ity distribution over the set F that is given by π ◦(x∗)
−1 . In other words, to every allocation a ∈ F, assign
the probability of the set of states s such that x∗ (s)=a. This distribution, together with the allocation of
the divisible good, summarizes an equilibrium allocation of the sunspots model.
This speciﬁcation of the sunspots model is fairly standard. We now turn our attention to the lottery
model, which we modify to allow for constraints on the randomization possibilities.
2.3 The Lottery Model
Following Prescott and Townsend (1984a,b), we treat each consumption bundle in C as a separate com-
modity, so that there are K commodities (plus the divisible good). A quantity of commodity k corresponds
to the probability of receiving bundle ck. In this way, consumers in the lottery model directly choose proba-
bility distributions over C, which are called lotteries. However, in the constrained lottery model consumers
are not able to purchase an arbitrary probability distribution over C. Rather, they are only able to choose
lotteries that can be generated by the pre-speciﬁed randomizing device. As in the sunspots model, it is
natural to think of a roulette wheel. However, in the lottery model consumers are not able to specify how
their lottery is arranged on the wheel. As an example, suppose the wheel has two equally-likely slots (black
and red) and that a consumer purchases a lottery that delivers a particular bundle with probability one-half.
The consumer is not able to specify whether she will receive that bundle when the black slot is realized or
7when the red slot is realized. If she could, she would be buying state-contingent consumption and we would
be back in the sunspots model. Instead, the task of arranging the demanded lotteries on the wheel so that
they meet feasibility requirements is left to the wheel’s operator; we discuss this in detail below. This is the
fundamental difference between the two models: commodities in the sunspots model are indexed by states
of nature, while in the lottery model they are indexed by probabilities.
2.3.1 Constrained Lotteries and Consumer Choice
An individual lottery is a probability distribution δh over C. Because C is a ﬁnite set, this distribution is a





where δ (ck) is the probability assigned to the consumption bundle ck. An individual consumption plan is a
pair (δh,c 0h) specifying a lottery over C and a (certain) amount of the divisible good.
Instead of allowing agents to assign arbitrary probabilities to each bundle, we restrict trade to lotteries
that can be generated by the given randomizing device. Let ∆(C) denote the set of all probability distri-
butions over the bundles of indivisible goods; this is equivalent to the (K − 1)-dimensional unit simplex in
RK. Only a fraction of these lotteries can actually be generated by the roulette wheel. Consider a function
gh that assigns an element of C to each of the M slots on the wheel. Abusing notation somewhat, let M
also represent the set of slots on the wheel, so that we have
gh : M → C.
Let G be the set of all such functions (note that since M and C are ﬁnite sets, G is also a ﬁnite set). Then


















As an example, suppose that K =3and that there are 3 equally-likely slots on the wheel. Then ∆(C) is the
triangular simplex shown in ﬁgure 1. The set Γ(C) contains those lotteries in which the probability placed
on each consumption bundle is a multiple of one-third; these are the ten dots in the ﬁgure. Each consumer
must choose one of these lotteries. In this way, the consumer is constrained to choose a lottery that is
“available in the market.” It is important to recognize that this is exactly the set of probability distributions
8Figure 1: The set of possible individual lotteries
over C that a consumer in the sunspots model can construct using state-contingent commodities when there
are three equally-likely states. This is what we mean when we say that our (generalized) lottery model
constrains consumer choice in the same way the ﬁnite-state sunspot model does.
We again take the divisible good to be the numeraire. A general formulation of lottery prices is then a
function
φ : Γ(C) → R+,
that is, a function that assigns a price (in units of the divisible good) to each possible lottery over the





δh (ck)uh(ck)+vh (c0h), (3)
subject to φ(δh)+c0h ≤ φ(eh)+e0h,
δh ∈ Γ(C),c 0h ∈ R+,
where eh here represents the degenerate lottery that gives consumer h’s endowment of the indivisible goods
with probability one. Notice that the consumer chooses one and only one lottery. We do not allow the
consumer to purchase multiple lotteries and combine them because the correlation structure would not be
9known to her (and hence the expected utility of such purchases would not be well deﬁned). Consumers
cannot engage in arbitrage activity in this model. Such activity is undertaken solely by ﬁrms, as we now
discuss.
2.3.2 Lottery-Producing Firms
Lotteries are produced by a representative, competitive ﬁrm that has access to the randomization technology
represented by the roulette wheel. The ﬁrm operates by buying and selling “lottery tickets,” where each
ticket entitles the holder to a particular lottery. Let j index the lotteries that the ﬁrm can produce, so that δj
is a typical element of Γ(C).L e ty
¡
δj¢
denote the ﬁrm’s net sales of tickets promising the distribution δj.
This number may be positive or negative, but must be an integer. Thus, a production plan for the ﬁrm is a
function
y : Γ(C) → Z,
where Z is the set of integers. The ﬁrm must choose a feasible production plan. That is, it must be able
to arrange the lotteries that it buys and sells on the roulette wheel in such a way that, for all realizations,
it gives away no more resources than it takes in. Let n index the individual tickets of lottery j bought or





¯. Each ticket is therefore identiﬁed by a pair (j,n),
indicating the type of lottery it delivers (j) and the number of the ticket within that type (n). We need to
count identical lottery tickets individually here because they may need to be generated by different slots on
the roulette wheel. A function gj,n that assigns the distribution promised by lottery ticket (j,n) to spaces




πm for all k. (4)

















Feasibility then requires that we have
X
j,n
Ij,ngj,n (m) ≤ 0 for all m. (5)
For each slot m, we add up the net resources the ﬁrm must deliver on all lottery tickets when m is realized;
this number must be non-positive. Conditions (4) and (5) together are equivalent to saying that each of the
10individual lottery tickets must be a marginal distribution of some common joint lottery.6 The production set
of the ﬁrm is
Y =
n
y : Γ(C) → Z : ∃ {gj,n}j,n such that (4) holds for each (j,n) and (5) is satisﬁed.
o
.






Before proceeding, it may be helpful to look at a simple example that illustrates how our ﬁrms differ from
those used in the previous literature (see especially Rogerson 1988).
Example: C = {0,1}. There is a single indivisible good that can only be consumed in either one unit
or not at all. Suppose that all consumers are identical and that prices are such that everyone demands the
lottery that gives one unit of the good with probability two-thirds and nothing with probability one-third.
First consider the case where there is a continuum of consumers and randomization is unconstrained. Then
the ﬁrm buys two-thirds of a unit of the good per consumer, and sells the demanded lottery. Each consumer
comes to the ﬁrm and a weighted coin is tossed to see if the consumer receives the good or not. Since the
coin tosses are independent across consumers,7 two-thirds of the consumers will receive the good and hence
this plan is feasible. This is the “traditional” approach to lottery-producing ﬁrms.
Next, let’s look at how the ﬁrm we described above operates in the ﬁnite case. Suppose that there are
three consumers and the roulette wheel has three equally-likely slots. The ﬁrm faces the above demand
conditions – all consumers want to receive the good with probability two-thirds. If the ﬁrm buys two units
of the indivisible good (or, more precisely, two units of the degenerate lottery that delivers one unit of the
good with probability one), it can offer three units of the demanded lottery. Consider the joint lottery
Roulette wheel slot: red black green
ticket-holder 1:1 1 0
Payoff to ticket-holder 2:1 0 1
ticket-holder 3:0 1 1
Looking at the columns shows that, regardless of which slot is realized, the ﬁrm pays out two units of
the good (exactly equal to the resources it purchased). Looking at the rows shows that each ticket-holder
receives the good with probability two-thirds, as desired.
Two comments are in order here. First, the plan of the ﬁnite-case ﬁrm only works if the number of
6 The idea of using aggregate or joint lotteries to ensure coordination when there is a ﬁnite number of consumers was introduced
in Garratt (1995), where coordination is provided by the auctioneer as a part of the market-clearing process.
7 This statement ignores problems associated with integrating over a continuum of i.i.d. random variables.
11tickets it sells is a multiple of three. There is no way it can sell four of these lotteries, for example, because
there is no joint lottery that would generate four such marginal distributions. (See Shubik 1971 on this
phenomenon.) Outside of this restriction, the ﬁnite-case ﬁrm behaves very much like the continuous-case
one: it purchases two-thirds of a unit of the good per customer and delivers the good with probability
two-thirds to each customer. Second, suppose that the roulette wheel has only two slots, with probabilities
one-third and two-thirds. Now the plan of the ﬁnite-case ﬁrm is infeasible, since there is no longer a joint
lottery that gives the same marginal distribution to every ticket-holder. That such seemingly small changes
in the randomizing device can have important effects is a recurrent theme in the ﬁnite case.
2.3.3 Equilibrium
The deﬁnition of equilibrium in our generalized lottery economy is the following.
Deﬁnition 2 A lottery equilibrium consists of a price function φ∗ : Γ(C) → R+ a n da na l l o c a t i o n
(δ∗,c ∗
0,y∗) such that
(i0) Given φ∗, (δ∗
h,c ∗
0h) solves the consumer’s lottery problem (3) for each h ∈ H,




















Condition (iii0) is the market-clearing constraint. It simply requires that the number of units of each lottery
that the ﬁrm produces be equal to the net demand for the lottery by households (here I is the indicator
function), and that the market for the divisible good clears.
Recall that a sunspot equilibrium allocation generates a probability distribution over the set F of (pure)
feasible allocations of the indivisible goods. The same is true in the lottery model. Let gh denote the ar-
rangement function for the lottery δ∗
h.8 Deﬁne g to be the vector-valued function comprised of the functions
8 This notation is slightly different from our earlier use of subscripts to the function g. Instead of indexing by type of lottery and
number of ticket, we are now indexing by the purchaser of the ticker. Of course, this is not important; it only serves to simplify the
argument here.
12gh, so that we have
g : M → CH.
The feasibility condition (5) guarantees that for every realization of the wheel, the assignment of resources
is feasible. Therefore we have g(m) ∈ F for all m.T h e nπ ◦ g−1 is the probability distribution over F
(or, the joint lottery) associated with the lottery equilibrium allocation. This relates the market-clearing
conditions here to those in Garratt (1995) and GKQS (in press). In those papers, market-clearing is stated
directly in terms of the joint lottery. This is because the joint lottery is arranged by the auctioneer (and
hence is naturally considered part of the market-clearing process). Here the joint lottery is arranged by the
ﬁrm and hence is determined by the ﬁrm’s equilibrium production plan.
3C o m p a r i n g t h e M o d e l s
While the two models are stated in very different terms, the literature (beginning with Shell and Wright
1993) has shown that they are actually quite similar. Our introduction of constrained lotteries has, for the
ﬁnite case, brought them closer still. In this section, we compare the sets of feasible allocations and of
possible prices in the two models. We show that the sets of feasible allocations are identical. In this sense,
our deﬁnition of constrained lotteries places the “right” restrictions on stochastic allocations in the lottery
model. The price systems, on the other hand, are fundamentally different.
3.1 Corresponding Allocations
Because an individual consumption plan is a function in the sunspots model and a probability distribution
in the lottery model, we need to be precise about how we compare these objects. At the individual level, a
sunspot consumption plan (xh,x 0h) induces a lottery consumption plan (δh,c 0h) through the equations
δh (ck)=π ◦ x−1
h (ck) for all k (7)
c0h = x0h. (8)
In other words, the probability assigned by the individual lottery δh to the bundle of indivisible goods ck is
equal to the probability assigned by π to the set of states in which xh delivers ck. Note that xh ∈ X holds if
and only if δh ∈ Γ(C) holds, that is, the lottery δh deﬁned in (7) is individually feasible in the lottery model
if and only if the plan xh generating it is individually feasible in the sunspots model. At the aggregate level,
a sunspot allocation (x,x0) induces a lottery allocation (δ,c 0,y) in two steps. First, the individual sunspot








for all δ ∈ Γ(C). In other words, y is the unique production plan that makes the consumption allocation
feasible. We now show that, through this relationship, feasible sunspot allocations always correspond to
feasible lottery allocations and vice versa.
Proposition 1 A sunspot allocation (x,x0) is feasible if and only if the corresponding lottery allocation
(δ,c 0,y) given by (7), (8), and (9) is feasible.
Proof: (a):Suppose that (x∗,x ∗









h e0h holds and (2) y ∈ Y holds. (That the individual lotteries being consumed are equal to those being
produced is guaranteed by the deﬁnition of y in (9)). The ﬁrst of these is immediate from the deﬁnition of
c0h in (8).
For the second, we need to construct the assignment functions that distribute each individual lottery on
the roulette wheel. From (9), we see that the ﬁrm is buying one degenerate lottery from each consumer
(her endowment) and selling one possibly-nondegenerate lottery to each consumer (her consumption). Ar-
ranging the degenerate lotteries is trivial (the same bundle is assigned to every slot). For the possibly-
nondegenerate lotteries, let f : M → S be the function that maps slots on the wheel to their “names” in the
sunspots model. We then deﬁne the assignment function for individual lottery δh by
gh (m)=xh (f (m)) for all m ∈ M. (10)
In other words, have the lottery-producing ﬁrm arrange the stochastic allocations on the wheel in exactly the
same way that they are arranged in the sunspots model. Then (4) must clearly hold for each h.F u r t h e r m o r e ,














(−eh + xh (s)) ≤ 0 for all s.
In this way, feasibility of the sunspot allocation guarantees feasibility of the lottery allocation.
(b):The proof of the converse is essentially the same argument in reverse. We start with a feasible
14lottery allocation and a sunspot allocation that induces it. Feasibility of the lottery allocation implies the
existence of assignment functions gh, which correspond to the sunspot consumption plans as in (10) above.9
The lottery feasibility condition (5) then implies that we have x(s) ∈ F for all s, and therefore the sunspot
allocation is also feasible. ¥
3.2 Corresponding Prices
Although both models generate the same set of feasible allocations, there is an important difference in
the way they assign prices. This can been seen in the context of a simple example. Suppose the roulette
wheel has two equally-likely slots. Pick an arbitrary consumption bundle ck and ask: What is the price
of receiving that bundle with probability one-half and nothing otherwise? In the lottery model, there is a
unique answer: φ(δ), where δ represents the speciﬁed lottery. In the sunspots model, however, the answer
is either [p(α) · ck] or [p(β) · ck], depending on the state (α or β) in which the bundle is purchased. Hence
the sunspots model has the ability to assign different prices to something that the lottery model considers a
single commodity. Now ask: What is the relationship between the cost of buying a bundle with probability
one-half (and nothing otherwise) and the cost of buying it with probability one? In the sunspots model,
there is a unique answer: the cost of buying ck with probability one is given by [p(α)+p(β)] · ck. In the
lottery model, however, no such relationship need hold between φ(δ) and φ
¡
δ0¢
,w h e r eδ0 represents the
(degenerate) lottery giving ck with probability one. In this way, the lottery model has more ﬂexibility in the
assignment of prices across different probabilities.
The critical issue is under what conditions the prices in one model can be translated into corresponding
prices in the other model. We ﬁrst introduce an additional piece of notation. Let Γ denote the image of
Γ(C) in the interval [0,1]. Then Γ is the set of probabilities that can be assigned to consumption bundles







. The same is true if there are two slots with probabilities one-third and two-thirds;
different randomizing devices can lead to the same set Γ.N o t et h a tw eh a v et h er e l a t i o n s h i p
Γ =
(
θ ∈ [0,1] : θ =
X
s∈A
π(s) for some A ⊆ S
)
. (11)
In other words, a consumption bundle in the lottery model can be purchased with probability θ if and only
if it can be purchased in the sunspots model in a set of states whose total probability is θ.
9 There is an additional complication in this direction: different sunspot allocations may correspond to the same lottery
allocation. Therefore matching the functions gh with the functions xh may ﬁrst require “relabelling” the slots on the wheel (or,
equivalently, changing the function f) in such a way that the probability of receiving each consumption bundle is preserved. See
GKQS (in press) for an extensive discussion of this many-to-one relationship.














In other words, suppose that whenever there are different ways of combining states together to get the same
probability, the total cost of purchasing any consumption bundle in either of the two sets of states is the
same. When this is true, the sunspots model assigns a unique price vector to each level of probability in
Γ, and therefore the sunspot prices can be transformed into lottery prices. Let b P be the set of functions
p : S → RL
+ satisfying condition (12).
Deﬁnition 4 Given a sunspot price function p ∈ b P,t h ecorresponding lottery price function φ : Γ(C) →
RL






for any A ⊆ S with
P




q(δ (ck)) · ck. (14)
The function q assigns a price vector to each probability in Γ. Any consumption bundles that are purchased
with probability θ are then priced according to q(θ). When a lottery price function φ can be represented
by a function q satisfying (14), lottery prices are linear in commodities. Prices in the sunspots model
are necessarily linear in commodities, and therefore any lottery prices that correspond to some sunspot
prices must have this property. Only when sunspot prices satisfy (12) will the function q, and hence the
lottery prices, be well deﬁned. If the sunspot price function does not satisfy (12), we say that it has no
corresponding lottery prices. If, for a given lottery price function φ, there does not exist p and q satisfying
(13) and (14), we say that φ has no corresponding sunspot prices.
To see what restrictions must be placed on prices in order for them to translate from one model to the
other, consider the case of three equally-likely slots on the wheel. In order for a sunspot price function p to
have corresponding lottery prices in this case, it must assign a unique price to receiving any consumption
bundle with probability two-thirds. This implies that we must have
p(1) + p(2) = p(1) + p(3) = p(2) + p(3)
16or
p(1) = p(2) = p(3).
In this case, sunspot prices would need to be constant across states in order to have corresponding lottery

















in order to correspond to some sunspot prices. If, however, there are only two sunspot states, with π (1) =
1/3 and π(2) = 2/3, then there is no restriction on the sunspot price function p. The only restriction on the












Hence the strength of the restrictions required for prices to translate from one model to the other depend
on the details of the randomizing device. Many restrictions are needed when slots are equally likely, while
fewer are required when each slot has a distinct probability.
4 Equilibrium Prices
In order for an equilibrium allocation in one model to also be part of an equilibrium in the other model,
at least one price function supports the allocation must translate to the other model. Hence knowing what
restrictions prices must satisfy in equilibrium in the two models is crucial for determining the relationship
between the two sets of equilibrium allocations. In this section, we investigate what restrictions can be
placed on equilibrium prices.
4.1 Sunspot Equilibrium Prices
We ﬁrst prove a result for the sunspots model. GKQS (in press, Theorem 2) show that with a ﬁnite number
of equally-likely states, any equilibrium allocation can be supported by prices that are constant across states.
We extend this result to the case where only some states are equally likely. We show that any equilibrium
allocation can be supported by prices in which π (s)=π (s0) implies p(s)=p(s0) for any states s and
s0. As shown in the previous section, such a result is critical for supporting the corresponding allocation as
an equilibrium of the lottery model, since the lottery model necessarily assigns a single price to receiving a
17bundle with probability θ = π(s).
We begin by deﬁning sets of individual consumption plans that are in some sense equivalent. Suppose
t h a tw eh a v eas u b s e tA ⊆ S of states, each of which has the same probability. Let NA be the number of
states in A, and suppose (without any loss of generality) that these states are consecutively numbered.
Deﬁnition 5 For any xh ∈ X and any set A of equi-probable states, the A-shift class of xh, denoted










holds for some t ∈ {0,1,...N A}, where the addition is modulo NA.
The idea here is simply to “shift” the consumption bundles across the equally-probable states of nature. If
these states were not consecutively numbered, the idea would be exactly the same (but the notation would
be more complicated).
The A-shift class is a set of plans among which a consumer with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences
would clearly be indifferent.10 We next show that this fact has important implications for the form of












The price vector pA replaces prices of states in A with the average price across those states. We want to
show that if p∗ supports some allocation (x∗,x ∗
0) as a sunspot equilibrium, then that same allocation is also
supported as an equilibrium by p∗
A. We begin with some lemmas relating the two price functions.
Lemma 1 For any equi-probable set A, if xh satisﬁes
X
s





for t =1 ,...,N A, then we have
X
s
p(s) · xh (s) ≤
X
s
pA (s) · xh (s).
10 Our results actually apply to a broader class of preferences, including those deﬁned by Balasko (1983).
18Proof: The hypothesis of the lemma implies that we have
X
s



















The right-hand side of this inequality replaces consumption in state s with the average consumption over all
states in A. Because this average is the same for all s in A, we can replace price vector p with pA without



















Note that since pA takes on the same values for all s in A, we can “undo” the averaging of the allocation.
In other words, for states in A, it makes no difference if we multiply the average price by the average












pA (s) · xh (s).
This establishes the desired result. ¥
We next show that we can make a stronger statement about equilibrium prices.
Lemma 2 Suppose (p∗,x ∗) is a sunspot equilibrium. Then for any equi-probable set A,
X
s




A (s) · xh (s)
must hold for all h.
Proof: Given local nonsatiation, individual optimization implies that an equilibrium allocation x∗
h must be
the minimal cost element of any A-shift class TA (x∗
h). Therefore, by Lemma 1, we have
X
s





A (s) · x∗
h (s)
for all h. Suppose that this holds with strict inequality for some h. Then summing this inequality across all











































A (s), this is a contradiction. ¥
With this information in hand, we are ready to prove a result on the form of sunspot equilibrium prices:
any sunspot equilibrium allocation can be supported by prices that are constant across equiprobable sets of
states.
Proposition 2 Suppose (p∗,x ∗,x ∗
0) is a sunspot equilibrium. Then for any set of equi-probable states A,
(p∗
A,x ∗,x ∗
0) is also a sunspot equilibrium.
Proof: It sufﬁces to show that (x∗
h,x ∗
0h) is still an optimal choice for consumer h when prices are given
by p∗
A. Lemma 2 shows that (x∗
h,x ∗
0h) is still affordable at these prices. Suppose it is not optimal for
some consumer h. Then there exists some other plan (e xh, e x0h) that is affordable at prices p∗
A and is strictly
preferred to (x∗
h,x ∗








A (s) · eh + e0h =
X
s
p∗ (s) · eh + e0h.
Let e yh denote the minimum cost element of TA (e xh) at prices p∗. Then (e yh,e x0h) is also strictly preferred to
(x∗
h,x ∗
0h) and e yh costs exactly the same as e xh at prices p∗




A (s) · e yh (s)+e x0h ≤
X
s
p∗ (s) · eh + e0h.
Because e yh is the minimum cost element of its A-shift class, Lemma 1 implies that we have
X
s




A (s) · e yh (s),
meaning that (e yh,e x0h) was affordable at prices p∗. This contradicts the optimality of x∗
h at prices p∗. ¥
20This result can be used to give sufﬁcient conditions on the randomizing device to guarantee that sunspot
prices have corresponding lottery prices. As an example, suppose that there are three states of nature, with
π(1) = π (2) = 1/6 and π(3) = 2/3. Then Proposition 2 says that any equilibrium allocation can be
supported by a price function that assigns a unique cost to receiving a particular bundle with probability
one-sixth. The other possible probabilities (one-third, two-thirds, ﬁve-sixths, and one) then have unique
costs as well. Therefore condition (12) is satisﬁed, and the corresponding lottery prices are given by (13)
and (14). In addition, when there are multiple sets of equi-probable states, the proposition applies to each
of them. Suppose there are four states with probabilities π (1) = π (2) = 1/10 and π (3) = π(4) = 2/5.
Then Proposition 2 says that we can ﬁnd support prices where p(1) = p(2) and p(3) = p(4).F r o mt h i s
it follows that each of the other possible probabilities (there are a total of seven in this case) has a unique
cost, and therefore (12) is again satisﬁed.
Notice, however, that the conclusion in Proposition 2 applies to equally-likely states, not to sets of states
that add to the same total probability. This distinction will be critical in our example in section 5.2 of a
sunspot equilibrium allocation with no lottery equilibrium counterpart.
4.2 No-Arbitrage Lottery Prices
In the lottery model, arbitrage arguments based on the constant-returns-to-scale nature of the ﬁrm’s pro-
duction technology can be used to place restrictions on the set of prices that could appear in equilibrium.
Garratt (1995) demonstrates that in a model where the auctioneer coordinates individual lotteries, the ab-
sence of arbitrage requires that lottery prices be linear in the underlying goods. This is also true under our
speciﬁcation of the lottery-producing ﬁrm.
Proposition 3 If there exists a solution to the ﬁrm’s problem (6), then there exists a function q : Γ → RL
+
such that (14) holds for every δ ∈ Γ(C).
Proof: Let e` ∈ C denote the commodity bundle that has one unit of good ` and zero units of every other
good, for ` =1 ,....,L, and let 0 ∈ C denote the zero vector; i.e., the commodity bundle that contains zero
units of every indivisible good. Let δ(θ,`) denote the lottery that delivers the commodity bundle e` with
probability θ and the commodity bundle 0 with probability (1 − θ). Note that this lottery is in Γ(C) if (and
only if) θ is in Γ. Deﬁne the new price function q : Γ → RL




for every θ ∈ Γ and for
` =1 ,...,L.
Consider an arbitrary lottery δj ∈ Γ(C) and let gj be a function that distributes δj on the lottery wheel,
21i.e., we have δj (ck)=
P
m:gj(m)=ck
πm for all k. The lottery δj is a K-dimensional vector
δj =( δj (c1),δj (c2),...,δj (cK))
whose elements sum to unity. Suppose that φ(δj) >
P
C q(δj (ck)) · ck held, and consider the following
production plan. Set y(δj)=1 , so that the ﬁrm is buying one unit of lottery δj. Partition M into sets
{Mθ1,...,M θi,...,M θ|Γ|} where Mθi denotes the sections of the wheel that occur with probability θi ∈ Γ.








[gj(m)]`, where [gj(m)]` denotes the `th component of the vector gj(m). Set all
other values of y equal to zero. This plan is feasible by construction. To see this, note that y(δ(θi,`)) gives
the total number of lottery tickets of type (θi,`) that the ﬁrm agrees to sell according to the production
plan. For each type of lottery δ(θj,`) place each of the n tickets on the wheel in the following way: For each
m0 ∈ Mθj and k =1 ,...,[gj(m0)]`,
gj(m)=
½
e` if m = m0
0 otherwise
Then (4) is clearly satisﬁed. Moreover,
P
(θj,`) I(θj,`),ngθi,`(m)=0and hence (5) is satisﬁed. Thus
we have that the speciﬁed production plan is feasible and generates positive proﬁts, which violates the no
arbitrage requirement. If φ(ˆ δ) <
P
C q(ˆ δ (ck))·ck the ﬁrm can earn positive proﬁts by performing the above
production plan in reverse. Therefore, if (14) does not hold, by replicating either the speciﬁed plan or its
negative the ﬁrm can earn arbitrarily large proﬁts and (6) has no solution. ¥
The previous literature has assumed that lottery prices are also linear in probabilities, that is, the price of
probability θ on any bundle ck is given by θψ · ck for some ψ ∈ R`
+. This is a much stronger restriction on
prices than that given in Proposition 3. Neither prices in the sunspots model nor those in the lottery model
need be linear in probabilities. However, lottery prices must be “additive” in a certain sense in order to
prevent ﬁrms from having an arbitrage opportunity. The precise restriction is the following.
Deﬁnition 6 For a given randomizing device, a lottery price function q : Γ → RL
+ is additive if for any set











where θm = π(m) for each slot m.
22Notice that this does not imply that prices are linear in probabilities. As an example, suppose that L =1 ,
and M =2with π(1) = 1
3 and π(2) = 2

















,q (1) = 1.
In this example, q(1) gives the price of receiving the good with certainty, which can be generated by adding




















. Our next result is that no-arbitrage
prices must have this type of additivity.
Proposition 4 If there exists a solution to the ﬁrm’s problem (6), then lottery prices are additive.
Proof: Suppose prices are not additive. Using Proposition 3, this would imply that there exists a set A ⊆ M

















holds. (The reverse case is symmetric.) Consider the following production plan. For each slot m ∈ A,
the ﬁrm buys one unit of the lottery that delivers one unit of good ` with probability θm and nothing with










. This plan is feasible by construction – the
ﬁrm takes in and gives out one unit of good ` if one of the slots in A is realized, and does nothing otherwise.
Under (15), this plan yields a strictly positive proﬁt. Since the ﬁr mc o u l dr e p l i c a t et h i sp l a no na na r b i t r a r i l y
large scale, the problem (6) has no solution. ¥
For the case where all slots on the wheel are equally likely, every probability in Γ is a multiple of 1
M.












for some integer α. In other words, in this case prices must be linear in probabilities. We state this as a
corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose the randomizing device has M equally-likely slots. Then if the ﬁrm’s problem (6)





The most important implication of the results in this section is that every no-arbitrage lottery price
function has a corresponding sunspot price function. While in principle there are many lottery prices that
cannot be represented in the sunspots model, none of them can ever support an equilibrium allocation in
the lottery model. To see why this is true, recall that a lottery price function has a corresponding sunspot
price function if there exist functions p and q such that (13) and (14) hold. The q function satisfying (14) is
given by Proposition 3, which tells us that no-arbitrage lottery prices must be linear in commodities. The
function p is constructed in the following way. For every state s in the sunspots model, set p(s)=q(θ),
where θ = π(s). This completely deﬁnes the sunspot price function p. What remains is to show that p does





for every A ⊆ S with
P
s∈A π(s)=θ, for all θ ∈ Γ. This follows from the fact that q is additive with












by additivity. We state this important result as our second corollary.
Corollary 2 Every no-arbitrage lottery price function φ has a corresponding sunspot price function p.
5 Comparing Equilibrium Allocations
We are now in a position to address our main question: Under what conditions do the two models
generate the same sets of equilibrium allocations? We begin by showing that this occurs whenever the
prices supporting the allocation as an equilibrium in one model can be translated into the other model.
5.1 Conditions for Equivalence
Corollary 2 states that any no-arbitrage lottery price function has a corresponding sunspot price function.
We begin by restricting sunspot prices to be such that they have corresponding lottery prices. We show that,
24under this restriction, the two models generate exactly the same equilibrium allocations. Any difference in
the sets of equilibrium allocations must therefore result from the more general form of the sunspot pricing
function and not from the way commodities are deﬁned or traded. Using Proposition 3, we can rewrite the









q(δ (ck)) · ck + c0h ≤ q(1) · eh + e0h,
δh ∈ Γ(C),c 0h ∈ R+.
We now present and prove the (restricted) equivalence result. Let (x∗,x ∗
0) be a sunspot allocation and let
(δ∗,c ∗
0,y∗) be the corresponding lottery allocation generated by equations (7), (8), and (9). Let Q denote
the set of all functions q : Γ → RL
+, and recall that b P is the set of sunspot price functions satisfying (12).
We then have the following.
Proposition 5 There exists a p∗ ∈ b P such that (p∗,x ∗,x ∗
0) is a sunspot equilibrium if and only if there
exists a q∗ ∈ Q such that (q∗,δ∗,c ∗
0,y∗) is a lottery equilibrium.
Proof: (a):First, suppose that (p∗,x ∗,x ∗
0) is a sunspot equilibrium with p∗ ∈ b P. Then we know that
at prices p∗, (x∗
h,x ∗
0h) solves problem (1) for every h. By applying a change of variables to replace the
















p∗ (s) · c

 + x0h ≤
X
S
p∗(s) · eh + e0h,
xh ∈ X, x0h ∈ R+.
Here, x−1
h (c) is the set of states in which the consumer buys the bundle c. Since p∗ ∈ b P holds, we can use
(13) together with the deﬁnitions δ∗
h = π ◦ x∗−1









(q∗ (δh (c)) · c) ≤ q∗ (1) · eh,
δh ∈ Γ(C),c 0h ∈ R+,
25which is exactly the consumer’s lottery problem as given in (16). Hence there exists a q∗ ∈ Q at which
(δ∗
h,c ∗
0h) solves problem (16) for all h, and condition (i0) in the deﬁnition of lottery equilibrium is satisﬁed.
Condition (ii0) requires that y∗ be an optimal choice for the ﬁrm at prices q∗. It is easy to verify that y∗
yields zero proﬁts at these prices. Because the prices are of the no-arbitrage form (see Section 4.2), positive
proﬁts are not possible and therefore the ﬁrm is indeed optimizing. Condition (iii0) follows directly from
Proposition 1. Therefore we have a q∗ ∈ Q such that (q∗,δ∗,c ∗
0h,y∗) is a lottery equilibrium.
(b):Now suppose that (q∗,δ∗,c ∗
0h,y∗) is a lottery equilibrium with q∗ ∈ Q. Because equilibrium prices
must be of the no-arbitrage form, reversing the argument above shows that at the unique price function p∗
corresponding to q∗ through (13), (x∗
h,x ∗
0h) is optimal for each consumer h. Therefore condition (i) in the
deﬁnition of a sunspot equilibrium is satisﬁed. Note that this p∗ is in the set b P by deﬁnition. Condition (ii)
in this deﬁnition follows directly from Proposition 1. Therefore we have a p∗ ∈ b P such that (p∗,x ∗,x ∗
0) is
a sunspot equilibrium.
This result establishes that when the price systems in the two models are comparable, the equilibrium
allocations are identical and the differences in the trading stories do not matter. Combined with Corollary
2, it implies that every lottery equilibrium allocation has a corresponding sunspot equilibrium allocation.
This provides a partial answer to our main question.
Corollary 3 Every lottery equilibrium allocation has a corresponding sunspot equilibrium allocation.
The remaining question is under what conditions sunspot equilibrium prices necessarily have corre-
sponding lottery prices, so that full equivalence between the sets of equilibrium allocations obtains. GKQS
(in press) and Kehoe, Levine and Prescott (in press) show that this is always the case when the sunspot
variable is continuous and lottery choice is unconstrained. When the randomization possibilities are ﬁnite,
it is not difﬁcult to construct examples where sunspot equilibrium prices have this form (both Shell and
Wright (1993) and GKQS, in press, contain such examples). We now present two results that give sufﬁcient
conditions for this to be the case. First, Proposition 2 implies that when all slots on the wheel are equally
likely, equilibrium prices in the sunspots model are linear in probabilities (Corollary 1 states that the same
is true for the lottery model). Hence in this case the sets of equilibrium allocations coincide.
Corollary 4 When the randomizing device is such that all slots on the wheel are equally likely, the set of
sunspot equilibrium allocations is equivalent to the set of lottery equilibrium allocations.
Next, we point out that a sunspot price function with no corresponding lottery prices can exist only if
the randomizing device is such that there exist two disjoint subsets of slots, both of which have the same
total probability. If this is not the case, then all sunspot prices automatically satisfy (12) and therefore have
26corresponding lottery prices. As our ﬁnal proposition, we show that the set of discrete randomizing devices
with this property is small – it has Lebesgue measure zero. This implies that the equivalence of sunspot and
lottery equilibrium allocations obtains for almost all discrete randomizing devices.
Proposition 6 GivenanyfundamentaleconomyandanynumberM ofslots, thesetofrandomizingdevices
for which the equivalence of the sets of sunspot and lottery equilibrium allocations fails has Lebesgue
measure zero.
Proof: The set of all M-slot randomizing devices can be represented as the (M − 1)-dimensional unit
simplex, which we denote by ΣM. The possibility that there exists a sunspot price function with no lottery







If there are no such sets A and B, then b P = P holds and Proposition 5 establishes full equivalence. Let αn
denote the number of ways of choosing exactly n of the M slots. Let βn be the number of ways of dividing
these n elements into two nonempty, disjoint groups. For any ﬁnite M and n, both αn and βn are ﬁnite




ways of creating nonempty, disjoint sets A and B that might satisfy (17); this number is also ﬁnite. Each
possible combination deﬁnes a linear (M − 2)-dimensional subset of ΣM, and therefore has Lebesgue
measure zero in ΣM. Hence the set of randomizing devices satisfying (17) is a ﬁnite union of sets of
Lebesgue measure zero, and therefore itself has Lebesgue measure zero in ΣM. ¥
This is not to say that any randomizing device with subsets of slots satisfying (17) will lead to nonequiv-
alence; it is only a necessary condition. For example, for nonequivalence to obtain we need at least one of
the subsets to have at least two elements, so that Proposition 2 does not apply. In addition, when M =4
with π (1) = π (2) = 1/10 and π(3) = π (4) = 2/5, there are several ways of creating sets A and B
such that (17) holds, but, as we mentioned in Section 4.1 above, applying Proposition 2 (twice) shows
that equivalence necessarily obtains for this device. Furthermore, a randomizing device where all slots are
equally-likely satisﬁes (17), but Corollary 4 shows that equivalence always obtains with such device. What
Proposition 6 shows is that the set of devices for which nonequivalence obtains is a (proper) subset of a set
of measure zero, and therefore has measure zero itself.
This result has an obvious probabilistic interpretation. Suppose the randomizing device were chosen at
27random in the following way. First M is drawn from any distribution over the set of integers greater than
one. Then a randomizing device is drawn from the set of M-slot devices using any distribution that has a
densitywithrespect toLebesgue measure. Withprobabilityone, the chosenrandomizingdevice willthenbe
such that equivalence between the sets of sunspot and lottery equilibrium allocations obtains. However, we
offer no theory of how the randomizing device is selected; it is certainly not clear that it should be viewed as
being randomly selected in this way. A government regulating risk classes in insurance, for example, might
impose a device with “critical” properties in order to achieve a desired allocation. Hence we cannot dismiss
sets of Lebesgue measure zero as being unimportant. We next provide an example of a sunspot equilibrium
allocation with no lottery equilibrium counterpart.
5.2 An Example of Nonequivalence
There is a single indivisible commodity, and all consumers have the consumption set C = Ch = {0,1,2}.11














Notice that π(1) + π (2) = π (3) + π (4) = 1/2, so that there are two different ways of adding states
together to get a total probability of one-half. The ﬁrst three consumers have utility functions that are linear
in consumption
u1 (c)=u2 (c)=u3 (c)=c,
while the fourth consumer has quadratic utility.
u4 (c)=c2.
The total endowment in each state is 3 units of the good, which is divided into the following private endow-
ments
(e1,e 2,e 3,e 4)=( 1 .15,1.11,0.4,0.3).
11 Note that there is no divisible good in this example. However, in the equilibrium we construct all consumers exhaust their
income. Because of this, it is straightforward to add a divisible good and keep the allocation (and price) of the indivisible good the
same. We present the example without the divisible good to simplify the presentation, and then we discuss below how to add the
divisible good.
28We normalize prices so that
P
s p(s)=1holds. Then the following is a sunspot equilibrium:
p∗ =( 0 .32,0.17,0.20,0.31)
x∗
1 =( 2 ,0,1,1)
x∗
2 =( 1 ,1,0,2)
x∗
3 =( 0 ,0,2,0)
x∗
4 =( 0 ,2,0,0).
This can be veriﬁed by computing the cost and the utility level associated with each of the 34 =8 1possible
consumption bundles to see that, at prices p∗,x ∗
h is the unique optimal choice for each consumer.
In addition, p∗ is the only price vector that supports this allocation as an equilibrium. First, note that
the fact that no resources are wasted in equilibrium implies that every consumer must exhaust her income
in equilibrium.12 Therefore, at any prices that support x∗ as an equilibrium, the four budget constraints
must hold, as must our price normalization equation. The budget constraints are not linearly independent
equations – any allocation that does not waste resources and satisﬁes the ﬁrst three will also satisfy the
fourth. Therefore we drop the fourth budget constraint and, writing p and x∗
h as column vectors, arrive at


















There are no prices on the right-hand side of the budget constraints because of our choice of price normal-
ization. The equilibrium allocation for this example was chosen to that the matrix of allocations (with the
column of 1’s appended) is full rank. As a result, there is a unique solution to this equation for the prices,
which is the equilibrium prices p∗. Hence no other price vector can support x∗ as an equilibrium allocation.
Notice that consumer 1 receives one unit of the good in states 3 and 4, and pays p(3)+p(4) = 0.51 for
this. At the same time, consumer 2 receives one unit of the good in states 1 and 2, and pays p(1) +p(2) =
0.49 for this. In other words, two consumers are buying the same consumption bundle with the same
probability and paying different prices for it. This is something that simply cannot happen in the lottery
model. Hence the unique prices supporting this sunspot equilibrium allocation have no corresponding
lottery prices, and therefore the corresponding lottery allocation is not part of a lottery equilibrium. Why is
12 If some consumer were not spending all of her income, the value of total demand would be less than the value of total supply.
This would imply that aggregate consumption is less than the aggregate endowment in some state, which is clearly not the case
here.
29consumer 1 willing to buy one unit of the good in the more expensive states (3 and 4) rather than switching
to the cheaper states (1 and 2)? The reason is that she is able to purchase two units in state 1, which has
probability one-third. The proposed switch would require that she move her consumption of two units to
state 3, which only has probability one-ﬁfth; this would make her worse off. Hence consumption in states
1 and 2 is not a perfect substitute for consumption in states 3 and 4 because it changes the available options
in the remaining one-half of probability.
There is asimple trickfor adding adivisible goodtothisexample toverifythatthe result does not depend
on the absence of local nonsatiation. Endow all consumers with zero units of the divisible good. Set the
function vh so that the marginal utility of consumption of the divisible good at zero is less than the minimum
of the utility gained from purchasing the last unit of the indivisible good in each state. Then, since vh is
strictly concave, each consumer will demand zero units of the divisible good and the same consumption
plan for the indivisible goods, and we have an equilibrium with the prices and allocation given above.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have extended the analysis of the relationship between sunspot equilibrium and lottery
equilibrium allocations to a class of purely ﬁnite models. Previous work based on an exchange economy
with non-convexities has shown that when the randomizing device is continuous, the two sets of equilibrium
allocations are equivalent. Here we have focused on the case where the randomizing device is discrete and
the number of possible lotteries is ﬁnite. We have generalized the lottery model so that it can be applied to
such economies. Our main ﬁnding is that equivalence between the two sets of equilibrium allocations often,
but not always, obtains.
The key difference between the two models, and the source of potential nonequivalence, is in their
respective price systems. We show that equivalence will hold unless prices in the sunspots model are such
that buying a particular consumption bundle with a particular probability has two (or more) different costs
assigned to it, depending on which states of nature the bundle is purchased in. For all randomizing devices
except a set of measure zero, this cannot happen simply because each probability is generated by a unique
combination of states. A different argument shows that equivalence also obtains for the “leading” case
where all events are equally likely. In this case, it is the ability of consumers or ﬁrms to substitute, or
“shift,” their purchases from high-cost to low-cost states that is critical for the result. Hence the equivalence
result proven in GKQS (in press) and Kehoe, Levine, and Prescott (in press) does not depend on having
a continuous sunspot variable (or, unconstrained randomization possibilities). It naturally extends to large
class of models with ﬁnite randomization possibilities.
30We also present an example of nonequivalence: a sunspot equilibrium allocation with no lottery equi-
librium counterpart. In the example, the slots on the wheel each have a different probability. Hence at least
some of the states have “monopoly power,” in the sense that consumers cannot buy the same probability
using a combination of the other states. In such cases, the extra generality available in the price system in
the sunspots model is important. This result is similar in spirit to that of Garratt (1995), who showed that
all lottery equilibrium allocations have corresponding sunspot equilibrium allocations, but that the converse
is not true. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the results here are fundamentally different be-
cause we are using a generalized lottery model that constrains the randomization opportunities available to
agents. The sunspot equilibrium allocation that Garratt (1995) shows to have no lottery equilibrium coun-
terpart does have a counterpart in our generalized lottery model. Our example of nonequivalence based on
the additional ﬂexibility of prices in the sunspots model is an entirely new and different phenomenon. We
have redeﬁned the lottery model to bring it as close as possible to the sunspots model. Nonetheless, there
are still some sunspot equilibrium allocations that are not lottery equilibrium allocations.
As a ﬁnal note, we reiterate that the environment we have studied in this analysis, as well as those
studied by GKQS (in press) and Kehoe, Levine, and Prescott (in press), is special. Markets are perfect,
the number of commodities in the underlying certainty economy is ﬁnite, there is no role for money, etc.
Sunspot equilibrium has been applied in a much wider range of settings. It is unclear whether and how the
lottery model can be extended to many of these environments. A recent step in this direction was made by
Berentsen, Molico, and Wright (in press), who introduced lotteries into search-theoretic models of money.
Whenever the lottery model is extended to a new environment, it is natural to ask whether or not equivalence
of the two sets of equilibrium allocations obtains. We expect that the basic approach we have taken here, if
not our speciﬁc results, will be useful in addressing the equivalence question whenever it arises.
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